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Buffer overflow in Andreas Huggel Exiv2 before 0.9 does not null terminate
strings before calling the sscanf function, which allows remote attackers to
cause a denial of service (application crash) via images with crafted IPTC
metadata.
Vulnerability Type Affected Product Root Cause
Impact Attacker Type Attack Vector
Figure 1: An example of CVE description
ABSTRACT
Soware vulnerabilities have been continually disclosed and docu-
mented. An important practice in documenting vulnerabilities is to
describe the key vulnerability aspects, such as vulnerability type,
root cause, aected product, impact, aacker type and aack vector,
for the eective search and management of fast-growing vulnerabil-
ities. We investigate 120,103 vulnerability reports in the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) over the past 20 years. We
nd that 56%, 85%, 38% and 28% of CVEs miss vulnerability type,
root causes, aack vector and aacker type respectively. To help
to complete the missing information of these vulnerability aspects,
we propose a neural-network based approach for predicting the
missing information of a key aspect of a vulnerability based on the
known aspects of the vulnerability. We explore the design space of
the neural network models and empirically identify the most eec-
tive model design. Using a large-scale vulnerability dataset from
CVE, we show that we can eectively train a neural-network based
classier with less than 20% of historical CVEs. Our model achieves
the prediction accuracy 94%, 79%, 89%and 70% for vulnerability type,
root cause, aacker type and aack vector, respectively. Our abla-
tion study reveals the prominent correlations among vulnerability
aspects and further conrms the practicality of our approach.
1 INTRODUCTION
Soware vulnerabilities are aws or weaknesses present in soware
products, which can be exploited to damage system or information
condentiality, integrity and availability [11]. Signicant eorts
have been made to document and manage publicly known soware
vulnerabilities. At the core of these eorts is the Common Vulner-
abilities and Exposures (CVE) [29]. CVE is a list of entries - each
reporting a publicly known vulnerability with an unique identica-
tion number, a description, and at least one public reference. CVE
entries are used or enriched in numerous security products and ser-
vices, such as U.S. National Vulnerability Database[30], Symantec
SecurityFocus [42], CVE Details [8].
SQL injection vulnerability in the Cybozu Garoon 4.0.0 to 4.10.0
allows attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary SQL
commands via the Log Search function of application 'logging'.
(a) CVE-2019-5934: missing Root Cause
via shell metacharacters inexecute arbitrary commands
D-Link DIR-655 C devices before 3.02B05 BETA03 allow remote
attackers to
the online_firmware_check.cgi check_fw_url parameter.
(b) CVE-2019-13561: missing Root Cause and Vulnerability Type
parse_audio_mixer_unit in sound/usb/mixer.c in the Linux kernel
leading to out-of-bounds
memory access.
mishandles a short descriptor,through 5.2.9
(c) CVE-2019-15117: missing Vulnerability Type
MetadataExtractor 2.1.0 allows stack consumption.
(d) CVE-2019-14262: only have Aected Product and Impact
Figure 2: Examples of CVEs that miss information
Figure 1 shows the CVE description of the vulnerability entry
CVE-2005-4676. As highlighted in this example, a high-quality
CVE description should contain six key aspects of details of the
vulnerability [21], including vulnerability type (e.g., buer overow),
aected product (oen also include relevant vendor/version/compo-
nent information) (e.g., Andreas Huggel Exiv2 before 0.9), root cause
(e.g., does not null terminate strings before calling sscanf ), aacker
type (e.g., remote aacker), impact (e.g., cause a denial of service
(application crash)), and aack vector (e.g., via images with craed
IPTC metadata). Describing these key aspects is crucial for CVE
management, mitigation and prevention, for example, detect and
remove duplicate CVE entries [5], identify commonweaknesses and
aack paerns [3, 7], timely analysis of high-risk CVEs [20, 39, 42].
We collect 120,103 CVEs from January 1999 to October 2019,
and inspect the presence or absence of the above-mentioned six
key aspects in the description of these 120,103 CVEs. We nd that
almost all (over 99%) of CVEs describe aected product. In fact,
when submiing a new CVE request, the reporter must specify the
aected product. However, all other ve key aspects can be le
unspecied. Figure 2 presents some examples. Among these ve
key aspects, 94% of CVEs describe the impact. Impact describes
what the aacker gains by exploiting this vulnerability, which is
relatively easy to observe. Compared with the impact, much more
CVEs miss the other four more technical aspects - vulnerability
type, root cause, aacker type and aack vector. According to the
guideline of CVE key details [21], a CVE should describe either
vulnerability type or root cause, but not necessarily both. We found
that 58% of CVEs describe either vulnerability type or root cause,
and a small 3% of CVEs describe both. But the rest 42% describe
neither of them. Furthermore, 28% of CVEs miss aacker type, and
38% of CVEs miss aack vector.
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Some third-party communities or security product vendors may
augment the missing details. For example, CVE Details [8] commu-
nity aempt to identify vulnerability type of each CVE, and Security
Focus [42] tries to assign a root-cause class to each CVE. However,
there are oen inconsistencies across dierent data sources [9]. We
observe that as the coherent aspects of a vulnerability, dierent as-
pects of vulnerability manifest semantic correlations. In this work,
we would like to explore these semantic correlations to predict
the missing aspects of a vulnerability based on its known aspects,
without the dependence on third-party input. Rule-based approach
is infeasible in this task for two main reasons. First, vulnerabil-
ity aspects are described in natural language, and thus have large
variations in terms of words and expressions used (see Table 1 for
examples). Second, the correlations among dierent vulnerability
aspects and their combinations are intricate, and thus cannot be
easily expressed as a set of explicit rules (see the experiment results
of aspect fusion and ablation in Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.5).
In this work, we solve the prediction task using a neural-network
based text classier. We carefully explore the design space of the
neural-network based classier, including two model architectures
(early aspect fusion versus late aspect fusion), three types of input
text (original CVE description, the concatenation of CVE aspects
in original appearance order, and the concatenation of randomly
shied CVE aspects), general versus domain specic word embed-
dings, and two backbone networks (Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) versus Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) with dierent net-
work congurations (dierent network layers and with or without
aention mechanism) (see Section 3). e neural-network based
classier learns the intricate correlations among dierent vulner-
ability aspects directly from the natural language description of
existing vulnerabilities, and thus removes the need of manual fea-
ture engineering. Once learned, these intricate correlations allow
the classier to predict the missing aspect of a vulnerability based
on the known aspects of this vulnerability.
As over 94% of CVEs do not miss aected product and impact,
we focus the prediction on the other four aspects (vulnerability
type, root cause, aacker type, and aack vector) which suer from
more serious information missing. e prediction is a multi-class
classication task. Table 2 lists the class labels of the four aspects
collected from 51,803 existing CVEs. Section 2 describes how we
collect these aspect labels. We rst randomly sample 20% per year
from 1999 to 2019. We extract CVE aspects from these sampled
CVEs. Based on the extracted CVE aspects, we develop regular
expression paerns to extract CVE aspects from the rest of CVEs.
Considering the large number of the extracted CVE aspects, we
adopt a sampling method [41] to estimate the accuracy of the ex-
tracted information. e extracted CVE aspects are of high quality
(>97% accuracy at the 95% condence level and 5% error margin).
We build a dataset of 51,803 CVEs which contain at least four of
the six CVE aspects. We use one aspect as the “missing” aspect to be
predicted and the rest aspects as known aspects that the prediction
is based on. We conduct extensive experiments to study the impact
of dierent design choices of the neural-network classier on the
prediction performance. Our results show that the optimal network
design should use early fusion model architecture and 1-layer CNN,
and takes as input the concatenation of CVE aspects in the original
Table 1: Variations of aspect descriptions
Aspect CVE-ID Description
Vulnerability Type
CVE-2017-11507 cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability
CVE-2018-16481 XSS vulnerability
CVE-2018-10937 cross site scripting aw
Root cause
CVE-2008-1419 does not properly handle …
CVE-2010-0027 does not properly process …
CVE-2015-1992 improperly processes …
Aected product
CVE-2006-3500 e dynamic linker (dyld) in Apple Mac OS X 10.4.7
CVE-1999-0786 e dynamic linker in Solaris
CVE-2013-0977 dyld in Apple iOS before 6.1.3 and Apple TV before 5.2.1
Impact
CVE-2011-4129 obtain sensitive information
CVE-2005-2436 obtain sensitive data
CVE-2002-0257 obtain information from other users
Aacker type
CVE-2018-1000634 user with privilege
CVE-2018-1000084 low privilege user
CVE-2016-9603 A privileged user/process
Aack vector
CVE-2018-12581 use a craed database name
CVE-2019-11768 a specially craed database name can be used
CVE-2012-1190 via a craed database name
appearance order and represents CVE aspect descriptions in CVE-
specic word embeddings. is optimal network design achieves
the prediction accuracy 94%, 79%, 89% and 70% for vulnerability
type, root cause, aacker type and aack vector, respectively. We
also conduct ablation experiments to determine the most and least
prominent aspect or aspect combinations for predicting a partic-
ular missing aspect. Our results show that impact aspect has the
greatest impact on vulnerability type, while aected product and
vulnerability type have the greatest impact on root cause, aacker
type and aack vector. At the same time, root cause and aacker
type have least impact on the prediction of other aspects.
is paper makes the following contributions:
• Our work is the rst to investigate the aspect missing issue
of the CVE entries. We analyze 24,042 CVEs over the 20
years to develop rules for extracting six CVE aspects from
the CVE descriptions. We further analyze the severity and
characteristics of dierent CVE aspects.
• We design a machine-learning approach for predicting the
missing information of key aspects of CVEs based on the
known aspects in the CVE descriptions. Our machine-
learning model design systematically considers variations
in input formats, word embeddings, model architectures
and neural network designs.
• We conduct large-scale experiments to compare the eec-
tiveness of dierent model design variants, investigate the
prediction performance and theminimum eective amount
of training data, and identify the prominent correlations
among dierent aspects for reliable prediction.
2 EXTRACTION OF CVE KEY ASPECTS
In this section, we introduce the six key aspects for describing CVEs,
discuss how we extract these key aspects from CVE descriptions,
evaluate the quality of the extracted information, and report the
statistics of dierent aspects absent in CVE descriptions.
2.1 Preliminaries of CVE Aspects
CVE suggests two description templates: 1) [Vulnerability Type]
in [Component] in [Vendor][Product][Version] allows [Aacker
Type] to [Impact] via [Aack Vector]; 2) [Component] in [Ven-
dor][Product][Version][Root Cause], which allows [Aacker Type]
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to [Impact] via [Aack Vector]. ese two templates identify six
key aspects for describing CVEs. As the examples in Figure 2 show,
not all CVEs describe all six aspects. When submiing a new CVE
request, in addition to providing the natural language description of
these six aspects, the submission form provides pre-dened options
for vulnerability type, aacker type and impact. But the reporters
may select Other if the pre-dened options are not appropriate for
a CVE or leave them unselected.
Vulnerability type identies an abstract soware weakness
that a specic CVE corresponds to. e abstract soware weak-
ness is usually identied as an entry in Common Weakness Enu-
meration (CWE) [7]. When submiing a new CVE request, the
CVE reporter must specify the vulnerability type. ey can select
one of the 10 CWE entries in the vulnerability type list, including
Buer Overow (CWE-119), Cross Site Scripting (CWE-79), SQL
Injection (CWE-89), Directory Traversal (CWE-22), XML External
Entity (CWE-611), Insecure Permissions (CWE-276), Incorrect Ac-
cess Control (CWE-284), Integer Overow (CWE-190), Cross Site
Request Forgery (CWE-352), and Missing SSL Certication Veri-
cation (CWE-599). If the weakness (e.g., PHP Remote File Inclusion
(CWE-98), Carriage Return Line Feeds (CRLF) Injection (CWE-93))
is not in list, the reporter can select Other or Unknown, but mention
the weakness in the description.
Root cause is an error in program design, value or condition
validation, and system or environment conguration, which results
in soware vulnerabilities. When submiing a new CVE request,
the reporter may optionally describe the root cause in free-form
natural language, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. SecurityFo-
cus [42] abstracts the natural language root causes of CVEs into 11
error classes: Access Validation, Atomicity, Boundary Condition,
Conguration, Design, Environment, Failure to Handle Exceptional
Conditions, Input Validation, Origin Validation, Race Condition,
Serialization.
Aected product refers to [Component] in [Vendor][Product]
[Version] information in the CVE description. It identies soware
component in certain version(s) of a soware product that has been
aected by the CVE. As the examples in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show,
aected components can be source code le, function, or executable.
When submiing a new CVE request, the reporter must provide
aected product(s) and version(s), and product vendor(s).
Attacker type describes the way by which an aacker may
exploit the CVE. When submiing a new CVE request, the reporter
may select one of the six options: authenticated, local, remote,
physical, context dependent, or other. Authenticated means that
the aacker needs privilege or permission during the aack. Local
means that to exploit the vulnerability the aacker needs to be
logged into the operating system on a local machine or a guest
operating system. Remote means that the vulnerability can be
exploited through a network. e aacker may be either on the
adjacent or remote network. Physical means that the aacker
needs to be located near the victim or have physical access to the
vulnerable system to exploit the vulnerability, for example, touching
a workstation keyboard or USB device, “shoulder surng” to see a
workstation’s display, and touching the screen of a mobile device.
Context-dependent means that the type of access needed to exploit
the vulnerability is dependent on how the vulnerable product is
used. is is most oen used for libraries. Aacker type is an
Table 2: Classes of CVE aspects and their percentages
Vulnerability Type
Cross site scripting(CWE-79) 29.5% SQL injection(CWE-89) 17.8%
Buer Overow(CWE-119) 17.1% Directory Traversal(CWE-32) 8.9%
Cross-site request forgery(CWE-352) 7.1% PHP le inclusion(CWE-98) 5.7%
Use-aer-free(CWE-416) 3.2% Integer overow(CWE-680) 2.6%
Untrusted search path(CWE-426) 1.7% Format string(CWE-134) 1.6%
CRLF injection(CWE-93) 0.6% XML External Entity(CWE-661) 0.3%
Others 4.0%
Root Cause
Input Validation Error 51.7% Boundary Condition Error 24.5%
Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions 11.7% Design Error 11.0%
Access Validation Error 0.7% Atomicity Error 0.1%
Race Condition Error 0.1% Serialization Error 0.1%
Conguration Error 0.1% Origin Validation Error 0.1%
Environment Error 0.1%
Aack Vector
Via eld, arguments or parameter 51.7% Via some craed data 17.1%
By executing the script 14.0% HTTP protocol correlation 4.4%
Call API 3.3% Others 8.0%
Aacker Type
Remote aacker 72.8% Local aacker 11.1%
Authenticated user 8.1% Context-dependent 2.9%
Physically proximate aacker 0.3% Others 4.7%
optional eld. at is, the reporters leave this eld unspecied or
as other. But they may mention aacker type in natural language
description.
Impact indicates what the aacker gains by exploiting this vul-
nerability. When submiing a new CVE request, the reporter may
select one of the ve options: code execution, information disclo-
sure, denial of service, escalation of privileges, or other. Impact is
an optional eld, which can be le unspecied. But the reporter
generally describes the impact in natural language description.
Attack vector describes themethod of exploitation, for example,
to exploit vulnerability, someone must open a craed JPEG le.
When submiing a new CVE request, aack vector is an optional
eld. When provided, it will be only in natural language description.
We manually label aack vector descriptions into ve common
types: via eld, arguments or parameters, via some craed data, by
executing the script, HTTP protocol correlation, call API.
2.2 Rule-Based Extraction of CVE Aspects
We randomly sample 20% of the reported CVEs per year from 1999
to 2019 (in total 24,042 CVEs examined). We observe that about
71% of CVE descriptions follow the suggested templates [21], such
as those in Figure 1 and Figure 2(a)(b). We see the increasing trend
of following the suggested templates over time due to the continual
standardization eort of the CVE organization. e rest 29% of CVE
descriptions do not follow the suggested templates, such as those
in Figure 2(c)(d). However, even for those non-template-following
CVE descriptions, the descriptions of CVE aspects still exhibit simi-
lar paerns. Due to the input assistance of the CVE request website,
we observe commonly used phrases or their variants for vulner-
ability type, aacker type and impact. We also observe a list of
frequently aected products and their vendor names.
Based on our observation of the sentence regularities of CVE
descriptions, we develop a set of regular expression rules1 to extract
CVE aspects from CVE descriptions. First, we build a gazeeer (i.e.,
1Our aspect extraction tool and all experiment data/results are available at
hps://github.com/pmaovr/Predicting-Missing-Aspects-of-Vulnerability-Reports
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dictionary) of commonly used phrases for vulnerability type, root
cause, impact, aacker type and aack vector, as well as a gazeeer
of product and vendor names from CVE Details. Gazeeer based
matching is a basic but very useful technique for the extraction of
frequently seen concepts and entities in text [25, 36]. Phrases in
the gazeeer are dened as regular expressions to match not only
the extract phrases but also their variants.
We use the Stanford CoreNLP tool [26] to parse a CVE descrip-
tion sentence and obtain the POS tags of the sentence. Next, we
combine gazeeer matching and POS paern matching to deter-
mine the candidates of certain CVE aspects. Finally, we examine the
candidates against the two ocially dened sentence templates and
other commonly seen sentence-level paerns. ese sentence-level
paerns dene the commonly seen appearance order of dierent
aspects in a CVE description. For example, vulnerability type or
root cause oen appears together with aected product at the be-
ginning of the CVE description. Aacker type, impact and aack
vector oen appear together in the form of “allow [aacker type]
to [impact] via [aack vector]” or ”[aacker type] performs [aack
vector] in order to [impact]”. By examining the aspect candidates
against the sentence paerns, we can lter out false positive aspect
candidates. For example, “executing the script” can be an Aack
vector or Impact aspect, but puing “executing the script” in the
sentence “By executing the script …”, we can determine “executing
the script” is actually an Aack vector aspect.
2.3 Accuracy of CVE Aspect Extraction
We apply our aspect extraction tool to the rest 96,081 CVEs. We
extract 41003, 15129, 92132, 89053, 73134 and 67188 instances of
the vulnerability type, root cause, aected product, impact, at-
tacker type and aack vector aspect, respectively. Considering
large numbers of instances to examine, we adopt a statistical sam-
pling method [41] to evaluate the accuracy of the extracted aspect
instances. Specically, we sample and examine the minimum num-
ber MIN of data instances in order to ensure that the estimated
accuracy. MIN is determined by n0/(1 + (n0 − 1)/populationsize)
where n0 = (Z 2 ∗ 0.25)/e2, and Z is the condence level’s z-score
and e is the error margin. In this work, we consider 5% error margin
at 95% condence level. At this seing, we examine 384 extracted
instances of each aspect. One author labels the sampled instances,
and the other author validates the results. e two authors dis-
cuss to resolve the disagreement. e extraction accuracy is 97%,
96%, 96%, 98%, 99% and 98% for the aspect vulnerability type, root
cause, aected product, impact, aacker type and aack vector,
respectively.
2.4 Missing and Distribution of CVE Aspects
Based on the extracted CVE aspects (which are of high accuracy),
we analyze the missing of dierent aspects in the CVE descriptions.
We observe dierent severities of information missing for dierent
aspects. About 43.8% of CVEs describe specic vulnerability type.
Only about 15.2% of CVEs describes specic root cause. About 3%
of CVEs describe both vulnerability type and root cause. 62% of
CVEs describe aack vector, and 72% of CVEs describe aacker
type. Almost all (over 99%) CVEs describe aected product, and
over 94% of CVEs describe impact. We nd that about 31% of CVE
miss one aspect, 39% missing two, and 28% miss three or more
aspects.
Table 2 lists the class distributions of the extracted aspects. We
do not include aected product and impact because they do not
suer from signicant information missing. We can see that the
class distribution of an aspect is in general imbalance, which has
several frequent classes and many less frequent classes in the long
tail. We group the classes with the frequencies < 0.1 as Others.
3 NEURAL-NETWORK BASED PREDICTION
OF CVE MISSING ASPECTS
Motivated by the missing of key aspects in CVE descriptions, we
design a neural-network based approach for predicting the missing
aspects based on the known aspects in a CVE description. We rst
give an overview of our approach (Section 3.1) and then describe
the design of neural-network classier (Section 3.2-Section 3.4).
3.1 Approach Overview
We formulate the prediction task as a multi-class classication prob-
lem for each aspect. Considering the severity of the information
missing (see Section 2.3), we predict four aspects: vulnerability
type, root cause, aacker type and aack vector. Each aspect has a
corresponding multi-class classier, and the class labels for each
aspect-specic classier are summarized in Table 2.
As shown in Figure 3, our approach consists of a training phase
and a prediction phrase. Training phase uses the historical CVE
descriptions to train aspect-specic neural-network classiers. It
rst uses the aspect extraction method in Section 2.2 to extract
six CVE aspects from the historical CVE descriptions. en, we
prepare the training data for each aspect t to be predicted. For each
CVE that contains the aspect t , a training instance is created with
the class label of t (denoted as label(t)) as the expected output and
the description of rest of aspects r ∈ R (1 ≤ |R | ≤ 5) (denoted as
desc(r )) as the input. From such training data, the neural-network
classier is trained to extract syntactic and semantic features from
the input aspect descriptions and capture the intrinsic correlations
between these input features and the output class label.
At the prediction phrase, given an unseen CVE description, we
rst extract the CVE aspects present in the description. For each
missing aspect, the trained aspect-specic classier takes as input
the aspects present in the description and predicts as output the
most likely class label of the missing aspect.
e neural network classier consists of three layers: an input
layer that represents the input text in a vector representation (e.g.,
word embedding) (Section 3.2); a neural-network feature extractor
that extracts syntactic and semantic features from the input text
(Section 3.3); and an output classier that makes the prediction
based on the extracted features (Section 3.4). Next, we describe the
design of these three layers in details.
3.2 Input Text and Representation
e raw input to the classier is the textual description of CVE
aspects, such as those sentence fragments highlighted in Figure 1
and Figure 2. In this work, we consider three formats of raw input
text: 1) the sequence of separate aspect descriptions in the original
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appearance order (denoted as i-ao); 2) the sequence of separate as-
pect descriptions in a random order (denoted as i-ar); 3) the original
CVE description containing all input aspects (denoted as i-fu). i-ar
allows us to investigate the impact of the appearance order of CVE
aspects, and i-fu allows us to investigate the impact of additional
sentence parts in the original CVE description. Additional parts re-
fer mostly to preposition, pronoun and/or determiner that connect
separate aspect descriptions into a more complete sentence.
Words are discrete symbols. As the input to the neural network,
they must be represented in vectors. In this work, we use word
embeddings to represent words in a vector space, because many
studies [19, 32, 51] have shown that word embeddings can capture
rich syntactic and semantic features of words in a low-dimensional
vector. We consider both general word embeddings (denoted as
weд ) and domain-specic word embeddings (denoted aswed ). For
general word embeddings, we use word embeddings pre-trained on
the corpus of Google News text directly obtained from the ocial
word2vec website [14]. Google News word embedding is learned
by continuous skip-gram model [27]. For domain-specic word
embeddings, we compile two corpora: one from CVE descriptions
and the other from the vulnerability report in SecurityFocus. We
set the vocabulary size at 50,000 and learns domain-specic word
embeddings on these two corpora separately using continuous
skip-gram model (the Python implementation in Gensim [35]). e
output of word embedding learning is a dictionary of words, each
of which has a d-dimensional vector. In this work, we set d at 300
as in existing studies [13, 16, 48].
Let the input text be a sequence of N wordswi (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). is
input text is represented as a N ×d matrix: i=v(w1) ⊕v(w2) ⊕ ... ⊕
v(wN ), where ⊕ is vector concatenation andv(wi ) returns the word
embedding of the wordwi in the dictionary. We randomly initialize
corresponding word vectors to deal with these Out-of-Vocabulary
(OOV) words [52]. Dierent CVEs may have dierent numbers of
known CVE aspects. To keep the model architecture consistent, we
set an input aspect as an empty string if the CVE does not contain
this input aspect.
3.3 Neural Network Feature Extractors
A neural-network feature extractor takes as input the matrix i from
the input layer and computes as output a feature vector o which is
fed into the output Somax classier for prediction.
3.3.1 Model Architecture. As our input consists of separate CVE
aspects, we design two model architectures to investigate the eec-
tive mechanism for incorporating CVE aspects and capturing their
intrinsic correlations: early fusion versus late fusion. As shown
in Figure 4, early fusion architecture rst concatenates the input
matrix of each aspect into one input matrix, which is fed into a
single neural network to extract and fuse features from dierent
aspects. In contrast, late fusion architecture feeds the input matrix
of each aspect into a neural network separately and then fuse the
output feature vector of the separate networks by a fully connected
layer. All neural networks share the same network conguration,
but they will learn dierent weights in dierent architectures. Both
early fusion and late fusion are applicable to the input formats i-ao
and i-ar. But only early fusion is applicable to the input format i-fu,
because i-fu merges the input CVE aspects into a whole sentence.
3.3.2 Backbone Network. We consider two popular neural netwo-
rks used for text classication in the literature [15, 17, 18]: Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN) and Bi-directional Long-Short Term
Memory (BiLSTM). CNN is good at capturing important words and
phrases in the text, while BiLSTM is good at capturing longer-range
dependencies in text. We design various variants of these two net-
works. First, we consider shallow (1-layer) versus deep (> 1 layer)
neural network. Second, we consider adding aention layer on top
of LSTM layer to weight word importance. As such, we obtain six
neural network models for feature extraction:
1-layer CNN: Figure 5 shows 1-layer CNN model, which con-
sists of one convolution layer and a 1-max pooling layer. e
convolution layer applies M lters to the input matrix i of word
embeddings. A lter is a h ×w matrix whose values will be learned
during model training. h is called height or window size. It refers
to the number of consecutive words (e.g., n-gram) the lters apply
to. In this work, we use three dierent window sizes h=1, 3, 5. at
is, the lters extract features from 1-grams, 3-grams and 5-grams
respectively. e width w of lters is set to the dimensionality d
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of word embeddings because the lters should retain the integrity
of the input word embeddings. For each word window, a lter
computes a real value, which is fed into the non-linear activation
function ReLU [12]: ReLU(x)=max(0,x). A lter scans the input
word sequence (zero-padding at both ends to allow the lter to ex-
tract features from the beginning and the end of the input sentence)
with stride=1. is type of lters is also known as 1-d convolution
as it scans the input matrix along only one dimension (i.e., the
word sequence). Aer scanning the whole input sequence, a lter
generates a feature map of the input sequence length. A 1-max
pooling is applied to this feature map to obtain the most signicant
feature for this lter. Due to the use of 1-max pooling, we do not
need aention layer to weight word/phrase importance. For each
window size, we useM=128 lters to learn complementary features
from the same word windows. at is, 1-layer CNN produces a
128-dimensional feature vector for each window size. e feature
vectors of all windows sizes are concatenated into an output feature
vector for the classier.
2-layers CNN:is is a deeper variant of the 1-layer CNN. e
rst CNN layer is the same as 1-layer CNN.e three feature vectors
by the rst CNN layer are fed into onemore layer of convolution and
1-max-pooling. For each input 128-dimensional feature vector, the
second layer also usesM (M = 128) lters with the window size h =
3. Aer the convolution, ReLu activation and pooling, the second
CNN layer outputs three 128-dimensional feature vectors which
are concatenated into an output feature vector for the classier.
1-layer BiLSTM: Figure 6 shows a 1-layer BiLSTM model. A
BiLSTM model consists of a forward LSTM
−−→
lstmf network that
reads the input fromw1 towN , and a backward LSTM
←−−
lstmb that
reads fromwN tow1:
−→
h i =
−−→
lstmf (wi ), i ∈ [1,n],
←−
h i =
←−−
lstmb (wi ),
i ∈ [n, 1]. −→h i and←−h i are forward and backward hidden vectors
for word wi . Both forward and backward LSTM have 192 LSTM
cells. So
−→
h i and
←−
h i are 192-dimensional vectors. e parameters of−−→
lstmf and
←−−
lstmf will be learned during model training. We obtain
the hidden vector hi forwi by concatenating
−→
h i and
←−
h i , i.e., hi =−→
h i ⊕ ←−h i (hi is 384-dimensional vector). hi is the output vector of
the Bi-directional LSTM for the input wordwi , which encodes both
the preceding and succeeding sentence context centered aroundwi .
We concatenate the last hidden vectors
−→
h N and
←−
h 1 into an output
feature vector for the classier.
2-layers BiLSTM:is is a deeper variant of 1-layer BiLSTM.
e rst layer is a 1-layer BiLSTM.e outputhi of the rst BiLSTM
layer is passed as input to the second BiLSTM layer which also uses
192 LSTM cells to encode input vector sequence. e last hidden
vectors
−→
h N and
←−
h 1 by the second layer are concatenated into an
output feature vector for the classier.
Attention layer for BiLSTM: For the BiLSTM network, we can
add an aention layer on top of the last BiLSTM layer to weight
the importance of words. e aention layer computes the word
aention weight αi = exp
(
(ui )T uw
)
/∑i exp ((ui )T uw ) where
ui = tanh (Wwhi + bw ). It takes the output hi of the BiLSTM layer
as input. hi is rst fed through a one-layer feed-forward neural
network to get ui as a hidden representation of hi .Ww and bw are
learnable parameters of the aention layer. en, we measure the
importance of the wordwi as the similarity of ui with a word-level
context vector uw and obtain a normalized importance weight αi
through a somax function. e vector uw is randomly initialized
and learned during the training process. Finally, we compute the
output feature vector for the classier as a weighted sum of the Bi-
LSTM output vector of each word in the input sequence multiplied
by the word aention weight, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 αihi .
3.4 Predicting Missing Aspects of CVEs
We use a somax classier as the output classifer. Given the output
feature vector F by the neural-network feature extractor, a so-
max classier predicts the probability distribution yˆ over the m
class labels of a particular CVE aspect, i.e., yˆ = so f tmax (WF + b),
where yˆ ∈ Rm is the vector of prediction probabilities over the
m class labels, andW and b are the learnable parameters of the
classier. e learnable parameters of the neural-network fea-
ture extractor and the classier are trained to minimize the cross-
entropy loss of the predicted labels and the ground-truth labels:
L (yˆ,y) = −∑Ki=1 ∑mj=1 yi j log (yˆi j ) where K denotes the number of
training samples. yi j is the ground-truth label of the jth class (1
for the ground-truth class, otherwise 0) for the ith training exam-
ple, and yˆi j is the predicted probability of the jth class for the ith
training example. e loss gradient is back-propagated to update
the learnable parameters of the classier and the neural-network
feature extractor.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We conduct a series of experiments to investigate the following
four research questions:
• RQ1 Design of neural network classier: How do dierent
input formats, word embeddings, model architectures and neural
network designs aect the prediction performance?
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Table 3: Aspect-specic CVE datasets
To-be-predicted aspect Vulnerability type Root cause Aack vector Aacker type
Size 36,103 20,813 35,289 43,330
% with vulnerability type 100% 61% 63% 66%
% with root cause 38% 100% 39% 37%
% with aack vector 75% 72% 100% 78%
% with aacker type 86% 86% 92% 100%
• RQ2Overall performance: Howwell can our approach predict
dierent CVE aspects?
• RQ3 Size of training data: How does the size of training data
aect the prediction performance?
• RQ4 Ablation study: What is the most and least prominent
aspect or aspect combination for predicting a specic aspect?
4.1 Experiment Setup
We describe the CVE dataset used in our experiments, our model
training seing, and the performance evaluation metrics.
4.1.1 CVE Dataset. CVE list can be downloaded from the ocial
CVE website [29]. In this work, we download the CVE list that
contains 120,103 CVEs from January 1999 to October 2019. We
use the aspect extraction method in Section 2.2 to extract CVE
aspects from these CVEs. Our evaluation in Section 2.3 conrms
the high accuracy of the extracted CVE aspects. To evaluate our
prediction method, we collect 51,803 CVEs whose descriptions
contain at least four aspects. As almost all CVEs contain aected
product and impact aspects (see Section 2.3), this means the CVEs
in the dataset contain at least two of the other four aspects. is
guarantees that we have sucient data to study aspect fusion and
ablation. For each to-be-predicted aspect (vulnerability type, root
cause, aacker type or aack vector), we build an aspect-specic
dataset for classier training and testing from these 51,803 CVEs
according to the method in Section 3.1. Table 3 summarizes the
information of the four aspect-specic datasets. All experiment
datasets and results are available at our Github repository. For a
specic to-be-predicted aspect (e.g., vulnerability type), the other
three aspects (e.g., root cause, aacker type or aack vector) of
the CVEs used as model input may also be missing, except aected
product and impact. is reects the realistic situation of CVE data.
at is, when predicting a missing aspect, it is oen not all other
aspects available as model input.
4.1.2 Model Training. We implement the proposed neural net-
work classier in Tensorow [1]. Each to-be-predicted aspect has
its own classier. As discussed in Section 3, we have dierent
choices for input format, word embedding, model architecture and
network design when implementing a classier. All the classiers
are trained in the same seing. Specically, we train each model
for 256 iterations with a batch size of 128, set learning rate at 0.001,
and use Adam [23] as the optimizer. All experiments run on an
NVIDIA Tesla M40 GPU machine.
4.1.3 Evaluation Metrics. e multi-class classication results
can be represented in a m ×m confusion matrix M , where m is
the number of class labels (see Table 2). We use Precision, Recall
and F1-score to evaluate the eectiveness of multi-class classica-
tion [37, 44, 47, 49]. Precision for a label Lj of an aspectA represents
the proportion of the CVEs whose missing aspect A is correctly
predicted as Lj among all CVEs whose missing aspectA is predicted
as Lj . Recall for a label Li of an aspect A is the proportion of the
Table 4: Impact of input formats
Vulnerability Type Root Casue Aack Vector Aacker Type
Precision
i-ao 0.945 0.779 0.708 0.884
i-ar 0.943 0.746 0.701 0.882
i-fu 0.946 0.783 0.703 0.888
Recall
i-ao 0.945 0.793 0.716 0.897
i-ar 0.945 0.770 0.710 0.892
i-fu 0.946 0.796 0.717 0.899
F1
i-ao 0.943 0.780 0.704 0.885
i-ar 0.943 0.745 0.699 0.880
i-fu 0.946 0.788 0.706 0.889
CVEs whose missing aspectA is correctly predicted as Li compared
with the number of ground-truth CVEs whose missing aspect A
is actually Li . F-score is the harmonic average of the precision
and recall. e overall performance of a classier is the weighted
average of the evaluation metrics of each class label. Since F1-score
conveys the balance between the precision and the recall, we use
F1-score as the main evaluation metric in the discussion.
4.2 Design of Neural Network Classier (RQ1)
Motivation: e design of our neural network classier consid-
ers three input formats (i-ao: separate CVE aspects in the original
order appearing in CVE descriptions, i-ar: separate CVE aspects
in random order, and i-fu: original CVE descriptions), three word
embeddings (Google News, SecurityFocus versus CVE-specic),
two model architecture (early aspect fusion versus late aspect fu-
sion), and six specic neural network design (CNN versus BiLSTM,
1-layer versus 2-layer, BiLSTM with/without aention layer). We
want to investigate the impact of these design options on the predic-
tion performance and identify the most eective design of neural
network classier.
Approach: We conduct four experiments to evaluate the impact
of input format, word embedding, model architecture and network
design respectively. For the experiments on one dimension, we use
the most eective options for the other three dimensions. Specif-
ically, for input format experiments, we use CVE-specic word
embeddings, early fusion architecture and 1-layer CNN. For word
embedding experiments, we use separate CVE aspects in original
order, early fusion architecture and 1-layer CNN. For model ar-
chitecture experiments, we use separate CVE aspects in original
order, CVE-specic word embeddings and 1-layer CNN. For net-
work design experiments, we use separate CVE aspects in original
order, CVE-specic word embeddings and early fusion architecture.
is experiment seing helps to reduce the large number of ex-
periments by the full Cartesian product combination of the design
options, and also facilitate the analysis of each design dimension
while xing the other three dimensions. To ensure the reliability
of our experiments, we perform 10-fold cross validation in all the
experiments. For each fold, we use 80%, 10% and 10% of data for
model training, hyperparameter optimization and testing respec-
tively. We conduct Wilcoxon signed-rank test [46] on F1-score
between dierent experiment seings. p-value < 0.05 is considered
statistically signicant (marked by * in the results tables).
4.2.1 Input Formats. Table 4 presents the results. We can see
that the three input formats do not statistically signicantly aect
the prediction of the four CVE aspects, with only 0.002-0.009 dier-
ence in F1 across the three input formats. e only exception is the
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Table 5: Impact of word embeddings
Vulnerability Type Root Casue Aack Vector Aacker Type
Precision
CVE 0.946 0.783 0.703 0.888
SecurityFocus 0.942 0.779 0.701 0.883
*Google news 0.932 0.759 0.687 0.869
Recall
CVE 0.946 0.796 0.717 0.899
SecurityFocus 0.944 0.792 0.716 0.894
*Google news 0.935 0.784 0.688 0.885
F1
CVE 0.946 0.788 0.706 0.889
SecurityFocus 0.942 0.783 0.703 0.883
*Google news 0.933 0.761 0.687 0.871
Table 6: Impact of model architectures
Vulnerability Type Root Casue Aack Vector Aacker Type
Precision
Early Fusion 0.946 0.783 0.703 0.888
*Late Fusion 0.921 0.751 0.671 0.844
Recall
Early Fusion 0.946 0.796 0.717 0.899
*Late Fusion 0.927 0.770 0.680 0.872
F1
Early Fusion 0.946 0.788 0.706 0.889
*Late Fusion 0.923 0.755 0.669 0.850
Table 7: Impact of neural network designs
Vul-Type Root Casue Aack Vector Aacker Type
Precision
1-L CNN 0.946 0.783 0.703 0.888
2-L CNN 0.933 0.765 0.673 0.852
1-L BiLSTM 0.939 0.761 0.682 0.867
2-L BiLSTM 0.939 0.770 0.688 0.870
1-L BiLSTM+Aention 0.941 0.769 0.690 0.873
2-L BiLSTM+Aention 0.943 0.778 0.692 0.876
Recall
1-L CNN 0.946 0.796 0.717 0.899
2-L CNN 0.935 0.775 0.701 0.878
1-L BiLSTM 0.938 0.778 0.706 0.882
2-L BiLSTM 0.941 0.780 0.703 0.883
1-L BiLSTM+Aention 0.943 0.778 0.713 0.887
2-L BiLSTM+Aention 0.945 0.792 0.714 0.889
F1-Measure
1-L CNN 0.946 0.788 0.706 0.889
2-L CNN 0.932 0.768 0.677 0.859
1-L BiLSTM 0.938 0.765 0.684 0.871
2-L BiLSTM 0.940 0.770 0.683 0.874
1-L BiLSTM+Aention 0.940 0.770 0.692 0.873
2-L BiLSTM+Aention 0.943 0.778 0.694 0.878
prediction of root cause by separate aspects in random order (i-ar),
but the dierence in F1 is not very large either. is suggests that
the phrase-level information in the CVE aspects alone can support
reliable prediction. e presence or absence of the additional infor-
mation (mostly prepositions, pronouns, determiner) that connect
CVE aspects in the original CVE descriptions does not signicantly
aect the prediction. Furthermore, the prediction is not sensitive to
the appearance order of dierent aspects in the CVE descriptions.
erefore, we use separate aspects in the original appearance order
(i-ao) as the default option.
4.2.2 General versus Domain-Specific Word Embeddings. Table 5
shows that domain-specic word embeddings (CVE and Security-
Focus) support more accurate prediction in all four aspects than
general word embeddings (Google News). e dierences are sta-
tistically signicant in F1. However, the two domain-specic word
embeddings have marginal dierences. is result can be aributed
to two reasons. First, domain-specic word embeddings learn mean-
ingful embeddings for domain-specic terms (e.g., CRLF, XSS, DoS),
which may be regarded as out-of-vocabulary words in general word
embeddings. Second, domain-specic corpus allows the learning of
“purer” word embeddings highly relevant to a particular domain,
while the word embeddings learned from general text may embed
some unnecessary “noise” irrelevant to the particular domain. In
this work, we use CVE-specic word embeddings as the default
option.
4.2.3 Early Fusion versus Late Fusion. Table 6 shows that early
fusion architecture performs beer than late fusion architecture
(statistically signicant for all evaluation metrics). is suggests
that using a single network to extract and fuse features directly
from all input CVE aspects is much more eective than extracting
features from each CVE aspect separately and only fusing the fea-
tures of dierent aspects at the end. erefore, we use early aspect
fusion as the default option.
4.2.4 Neural Network Variants. Table 7 present our experimen-
tal results on the six variants of neural network feature extractor.
We can see that 1-layer CNN outperforms the other ve variants.
So we use 1-layer CNN as the baseline to analyze the performance
of the other ve variants. Compared with 1-layer CNN, 2-layer
CNN has worse but statistically non-signicant performance for
predicting vulnerability type and aacker vector, but has statisti-
cally signicant worse performance for predicting root cause and
aacker type. is suggests that deeper CNN is less appropriate
than 1-layer CNN in our text classication task. e performance
of the four BiLSTM networks are very close. Neither deeper BiL-
STM nor aention mechanism statistically signicantly improve
the prediction performance. 1-layer CNN has beer performance
than 2-layer BiLSTM with aention (the overall best BiLSTM per-
former). Although the performance dierences are not large, the
dierences in F1 are statistically signicant for predicting all four
CVE aspects. is result suggests that using CNN to extract impor-
tant words/phrase features ts beer for our text classication task
than using LSTM to learn long-range sentence features.
According to our experiments on input formats, word embeddings,
model architectures and network designs, the most eective design of
the classier takes as input separate CVE aspects in original order,
uses CVE-specic word embeddings to represent input text, and adopts
early-fusion architecture and 1-layer CNN as feature extractor.
4.3 Overall Performance (RQ2)
Motivation: In this work, we predict four aspects: vulnerability
type, root cause, aacker type and aack vector, which suer from
dierent severities of information missing in CVE descriptions
(see Section 2.3). Although vulnerability type is a compulsory
aspect to enter when submiing the new CVE request, 56% of
CVE descriptions do not provide vulnerability type by leaving it
as Other or Unknown. Root cause, aacker type and aack vector
are optional. About 85%, 28% and 38% of CVEs do not provide root
cause, aacker type and aack vector, respectively. We want to
see how well our approach can augment these missing aspects for
CVEs.
Approach: We study the prediction performance of the most ef-
fective classier design identied in RQ1.
Results: e precision, recall and F1 results can be found in the
1-layer CNN rows in Table 7. Our approach achieves 0.946 in F1
for predicting vulnerability type. It also achieves very high F1
(0.889) for predicting aacker type. As discussed in Section 2.1,
vulnerability type and aacker type are clearly dened categorical
values. Each class label has a distinct semantic. is makes it easier
to make accurate prediction on vulnerability type and aacker type.
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Figure 7: Impact of training data size on F1-score
In contrast, the prediction accuracy for root cause is worse. Com-
pared with the distinct vulnerability types and aacker types, the
error classes of root cause are relatively less distinguishable, for
example, conguration versus environment, boundary condition
versus input validation, access validation versus origin validation.
e fuzziness of these error classes makes it more challenging to
accurately predict root cause. Another challenge for predicting root
cause is that there are six classes with only a very small number
of instances, for example, atomicity error, race condition error (see
Table 2). is is referred to as few-shot learning [45] which aects
the model performance.
Our approach does not perform very well for aack vector (only
0.706 in F1). is is because aack vector is oen highly related
to the information of some specic soware products or vulnera-
bilities. is is make it dicult to generalize the prediction model
from training CVEs to unseen CVEs.
Our approach can accurately augment the missing vulnerability types
and aacker types. However, it has limitations to predict fuzzy root
causes and product- or vulnerability-specic aack vectors.
4.4 Size of Training Data (RQ3)
Motivation: e prediction our approach makes is based on the
correlations between a to-be-predicted aspect and the other aspects
learned from the descriptions of historical CVEs. To understand
the practicality of our approach, we investigate the minimal data
required for training a reliable prediction model, and how the pre-
diction performance changes as the training data increases.
Approach: Again, we use the most eective classier design iden-
tied in RQ1. For each to-be-predicted aspect, we randomly split its
training dataset into 10 equal-sized subsets. We train 10 classiers
with n/10 (1 ≤ n ≤ 10) training data respectively. e training
data starts with one randomly selected subset. For each increment,
we randomly select one of the remaining subsets and add it to the
existing training data. e 10 classiers are tested on the same set
of testing data. We compute the evaluation metrics for the n/10
training data size. We perform 10-fold cross validation and obtain
the average metrics for each increment.
Results: Figure 7 shows the F1 results at dierent training data
sizes. As the size of training data increases, the prediction perfor-
mance improves. For Vulnerability type aspect, the performance
Table 8: Ablation results for predicting vulnerability type
Ablated aspect Root cause Aected product Impact Aacker type Aack vector
Precision 0.943 0.925 0.821 0.939 0.888
Recall 0.943 0.927 0.822 0.941 0.896
F1 0.943 0.925 0.821 0.939 0.890
Table 9: Ablation results for predicting root cause
Ablated aspects Vul-type Aected product Impact Aacker type Aack vector
Precision 0.740 0.734 0.739 0.781 0.780
Recall 0.751 0.741 0.755 0.793 0.795
F1 0.745 0.730 0.736 0.785 0.784
Table 10: Ablation results for predicting attacker type
Ablated aspect Vul-type Root cause Aected product Impact Aack vector
Precision 0.852 0.873 0.850 0.883 0.864
Recall 0.876 0.892 0.874 0.895 0.871
F1 0.861 0.878 0.847 0.881 0.863
Table 11: Ablation results for predicting attack vector
Ablated aspect Vul-type Root cause Aected product Impact Aacker type
Precision 0.659 0.696 0.568 0.680 0.670
Recall 0.693 0.701 0.601 0.700 0.674
F1 0.665 0.695 0.572 0.683 0.669
improvement is statistically signicant from 1/10 to 4/10 training
data. However, from 5/10 training data onwards, increasing the
training data further results in only statistically non-signicantly
performance improvement. For the aacker type aspect and impact
aspect, the performance improvement is statistically signicant
from 1/10 to 5/10 training data. However, from 6/10 training data
onwards, increasing the training data further results in only statis-
tically non-signicantly performance improvement. For the root
cause aspect, the performance improvement of training data from
1/10 to 8/10 was statistically signicant. As the size of root-cause
dataset is about half of the size of the other three aspects (see Ta-
ble 3), the amount of CVEs required for training a reliable root-cause
classier is similar to the other three aspects.
Our approach is practical as it requires only about 17,500-21,000
historical CVEs (less than 20% of all available CVEs) to train a reliable
classier for predicting various missing CVE aspects.
4.5 Results: Ablation Study (RQ4)
Motivation: As shown in Table 3, it is unrealistic to assume that
all other ve CVE aspects are available for predicting a particular
aspect. In this RQ, we want to investigate the impact of certain
CVE aspects unavailable as input on the accuracy of predicting
a particular aspect. is study has two important roles. First, it
identies stronger correlations (if any) among some CVE aspects
than others. Second, it identies the minimum subset of known
aspects required formaking reliable prediction of a particular aspect.
is also help us to understand the practicality of our approach.
Approach: For a particular aspect, we conduct ve experiments.
In each experiment, we ablate one of the other ve aspects in the
aspect-specic dataset, which produces an ablation dataset without
the ablated aspect. For example, for vulnerability type, we obtain
ve datasets without root cause, aected product, impact, aacker
type or aack vector for the ve ablation experiments, respectively.
Although the experiments in RQ1/RQ2/RQ3 do not assume the
availability of all ve aspects, the ablation of one aspect in this
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RQ means that we completely ignore this ablated aspect as known
aspect for model input, even the CVEs describe this ablated aspect.
We use the most eective classier design identied in RQ1, and
train and test the classier on each ablation dataset. We perform
10-fold cross-validation in all experiments.
Results: Table 8-Table 11 show our experimental results. We
compare the performance metrics with those by 1-layer CNN in
Table 7. For predicting vulnerability type, ablating impact results in
the most signicant drop (12.6%) in F1, followed by ablating aack
vector (5.6% drop in F1). In contrast, ablating aacker type and
aected product have a much less signicant impact, with 0.7% and
2.1% drop in F1 respectively. Ablating root cause almost has no
impact on predicting vulnerability type. As discussed in Section 2.3,
over 94% of CVEs describe impact aspect. erefore, our approach
will not actually suer from the performance degradation due to the
unavailability of impact as input in practice. Although unavailable
aack vector as input aspect aects the prediction of vulnerability
type, our approach can still achieve high accuracy (0.89 in F1).
For predicting aack vector, ablating aected product has the
most signicant impact, resulting in 13.4% drop in F1. However, as
almost all CVEs describe aected product, our approach will not
actually suer from the performance degradation due to the unavail-
ability of aected product as input. Ablating the other four aspects
results in much smaller drop (about 1.1%-4.1%) in F1. Among these
four aspects, vulnerability type and aacker type have stronger
correlations with aack vector than impact and root cause.
ere are no such a prominent aspect for predicting root cause
and aacker type as impact for vulnerability type and aected
product for aack vector. For predicting root cause, ablating vul-
nerability type, aected product or impact has relatively larger
impact (about 5% drop in F1), compared with about 0.4% drop in F1
by ablating aacker type and aack vector. For predicting aacker
type, ablating aected product results in relative larger drop in F1
(4.2%) than ablating the other four aspects. Again, we do not have
the real issue of unavailable aected product and impact as input
in practice.
Our ablation study identies two strong correlations: vulnerability
type and impact, aected product and aack vector. Although the
unavailability of certain aspect(s) in the CVE description degrades the
prediction performance of an unknown aspect, it does not signicantly
aect the practicality of our approach.
5 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Our approach relies on the paerns of CVE descriptions, in terms
of what aspects people describe in the vulnerability reports and
how they describe these aspects. is assumption holds in general
because there is a common knowledge about important aspects
of vulnerabilities and much eort has been made to standardize
the description of these aspects [21, 28]. erefore, paerns exist
in historical CVEs, which can be learned by an appropriate ma-
chine learning methods. Our approach currently uses a rule-based
method to extract CVE aspects from CVE descriptions. We obtain
aspect extraction rules by observing about 24000 CVEs from 1999
to 2019, and conrm the extraction accuracy of these rules. How-
ever, the development of aspect extraction rules may suer from
human biases and errors, and the developed rules may not cover
the emerging CVE description paerns. We are now investigating
machine-learning based semantic role labeling method to address
this limitation. Finally, although our study demonstrates the practi-
cality of predicting missing aspects of vulnerability reports, how to
integrate our approach in CVE submission process to improve the
information completeness of CVEs requires future study.
6 RELATEDWORK
Various databases have been created to document and analyze pub-
licly know soware vulnerabilities. For example, Common Vulner-
abilities and Exposures (CVE) [29] and SecurityFocus [42] are two
well known vulnerability databases. Common Weakness Enumer-
ation (CWE) abstract common soware weaknesses of individual
vulnerabilities, which are oen referred to as vulnerability type of
CVEs. New soware vulnerabilities have been regularly discovered
and added to the vulnerability database. For example, in about six
months from November 2019 to May 2020, 5,685 new CVEs have
been added to the CVE database.
e fast growing vulnerabilities demand automatic methods to
assist the analysis of the properties of newly discovered vulnerabil-
ities. As newly discovered vulnerabilities oen exhibit similar prop-
erties as historical vulnerabilities, machine learning approaches
have been proposed for predicting vulnerability properties. For ex-
ample, Bozorgi et al. [2] train a classier based on various features
in vulnerability reports, such as description and time stamp, to
predict the exploitability of a vulnerability. Han et al. [16] propose
a CNN-based classier to predict the severity of CVEs based on
only the CVE description. Gong et al. [13] develop a multi-task
learning method to predict seven vulnerability properties according
to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System [11]. Xiao et al. [48]
construct a knowledge graph of CVEs and CWEs, and propose a
graph embedding method to infer the relationships of soware
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Dierent from these works, our
work studies the information completeness of vulnerability reports
and develops a neural network classier for predicting the missing
information of key aspects in the vulnerability reports.
Neural network based techniques have been widely adopted
for text classication in natural language community [10, 22, 34].
ey have also been applied to soware text other than vulner-
ability descriptions, as well as source code. For example, Xu et
al. [50] develop a CNN-based siamese network to predict dupli-
cate questions on Stack Overow. Chen et al. [4] develop a similar
Siamese network architecture but their goal is to support cross-
lingual question retrieval. Li et al. [24] develop QDLinker based on
word embeddings and CNN for answering programming questions
with soware documentation. Mou et al. [31] propose a tree-based
CNN to embed source code for classifying programs and detecting
code paerns.
Much research have been done on predicting vulnerable or error-
prone components [33, 38], or assess in which ways a system is
more likely to be aacked[43]. ey use various features includ-
ing soware metrics, code churn, developer activity metrics, code
structure [6, 40]. Dierent from these works, our work analyzes
vulnerability text and learn correlations between dierent aspects
in the vulnerability descriptions.
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
is paper studies the information missing issue in the vulnera-
bility reports. We examine six key aspects of CVE descriptions
and nd dierent severities of information missing for root cause,
vulnerability type, aacker type and aack vector. We propose a
machine learning approach for completing the missing informa-
tion of these four aspects in the CVE descriptions. Our approach
uses neural network model to extract important features from as-
pect descriptions and capture intrinsic correlations among dierent
aspects. Our large-scale experiments identify the most eective
model design for the prediction task. Our model can be trained
eectively using historical CVEs, and the trained model can accu-
rately predict missing information of CVE aspects, which could
alleviate the information missing issue in the vulnerability reports.
Our experiments on the minimum eective amount of training data
and the prominent correlations among dierent aspects conrm the
practicality of our approach for completing missing information of
key aspects in vulnerability reports.
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